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FIRGINIA SECTION
THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW
CONTRACTS AND SALES
Joseph Curtis•
Co::o<TRACTS

!\' o W ah;er by Silence

Silence is not golden \vhen there is a duty to speak, but the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals found no duty when an owner permitted a
builder to complete a late performance but did not state that he would
seek damages for the delay. In May v. Martin/ the builder took approximately twenty months to complete construction of two houses; there was
evidence that they could reasonably have been completed in four months.
'When sued by the builder for the balance of the building contract price,
the owner counterclaimed for the additional sixteen months' interest that
he had had to pay on money borrowed to construct the houses. The jury
returned a verdict which denied the owner offset of these damages, but the
Court of Appeals found fault with two of the instructions that had been
given by the lower court. The first was that the builder should not be
held respor1sible if the jury should find that the owner had failed to take
reasonable steps to minimize the damage from the builder's delay. The
Court could find no evidence of the owner's failure ·in this respect to
warrant giving this instruction.2 The second was that if the jury should
find that the owner had acquiesced in the delay, the builder would not be
liable for the additional interest expense incurred by the owner. This the
Court held to be an incorrect statement of the law, as it gave to acquiescence the "same weight, meaning, and implication as waiver." The Court
stated that the owner could either treat the delay as a breach and declare
the contracts forfeited, or permit the delay and claim damages therefor,
"Dean and Professor of Jurisprudence, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New York University.
I. 205 Va. 397, 137 S.E. 2d 860 (1964).
2. \Vhere there is no evidence that could support an affirmative finding by the jury
on a matter, an instruction which permits them to speculate on it, although correctly
'itating the law involved, is generally held to be reversible error. See Foreman v. E. Caligari & Co., 204 Va. 284, 130 S.E.2d 447 (1963).
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without any duty to advise the builder of election of the latter course. 3
The case was remanded, however, for a jury's determination of the time
within which the work was to be performed since there was conflicting
evidence on that point.

Tendency to Imply Terms to Avoid Uncertainty and Indefiniteness
In High Knob, Inc. v. Allen4 written sales contracts and deeds to residential properties made no reference as to how the vendees were to obtain
water, but did proscribe the taking of water from the ground through
development of wells or springs. Faced with this impasse, the chancellor
had permitted the introduction by the vendees of an oral agreement whereby the vendor's water system was to be made available as the source of
water for their properties. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
chancellor's holding that the written contracts did not encompass the
entire understanding of the parties and obviously implied that there must
have been some other agreement on this point, admissible by parol under
the doctrines of partial integration and collateral contract. But even the
oral agreements introduced by the vendees failed to specify the length of
time that the vendor would be obligated to supply water. The chancellor
was not at all reluctant to find by implication that the term was for so
long as the vendor's water system was capable of supplying a reasonable
quantity of water and that therefore the oral agreements were not void for
indefiniteness and uncertainty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stressed
the tendency of the courts to tum away from a conscruction which would
render a contract void on these brounds, especially where there has been
partial performance as in the instant case.
Since it was not raised below, the Court refused to treat the point that
the oral agreements were barred by the statute of frauds as not to be performed within one year. However, since the implied term was for "so
long as the vendor's water system was capable of supplying a reasonable
quantity of water," the matter should fall in that category where the terminating event might possibly happen within a year, however unlikely it
is to do so, and thus it would not be within the scope of the statute.

Independent Collateral Agreement Not Ban·ed by Pm·ol Evidence Rule
Additional exposition on the parol evidence rule was given by the
3. Contentions of waiver by silence have sometimes succeeded in insurance cases, see
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, 215 Ill. 299, 74 N.E. 141 (1905), but the vie·w that there is
no duty to speak more often prevails, see Oriole Paper Box Co. ,., Reliance Ins. Co..
257 F. 2d 707 (4th Cir. 1958). Of course, silence when coupled with other circumstances may give rise to an estoppel.
4. 205 Va. 503, 138 S.E. 2d 49 (1964).
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Supreme Court of Appeals in Durham v. National Pool Equipment Co.o
In this case two written contracts had been entered into by the parties, one
for the supply of equipment for the construction of a swimming pool,6
and the other for the furnishing of technical advice by the equipment seller.
Plaintiff-vendee sought to establish the vendor's oral "guarantee" that the
total cost of the pool would be no more than 8,000 dollars and plaintiff's
action was to recover the excess of approximately 5,000 dollars which he
had expended. The two written contracts fixed the costs of the equipment
and technical advice, making no mention of such "guarantee," and the
lower court struck plaintiff's evidence and entered summary judgment for
the defendant-seller. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's
evidence tended to establish an indemnification agreement, independent of
and in addition to the written terms, since the subject matter of the written
contracts was confined only to the costs of the equipment and the technical
advice and did not encompass the actual construction of the pool and
total cost thereof. This independent collateral agreement, said the Court,
would not vary or contradict in any )vay the terms of the written contracts, and hence was not barred by the parol evidence rule.7 The case was
remanded, however, for the determination of the sufficiency of plaintiff's
total evidence to establish the oral agreement, since his oral testimony
was stricken before he had rested his case and the probative value of the
oral testimony alone was at least questionable for that purpose.

Promisee Need Not Assist Promisor's Performance
It is an implied condition of every contract that one party will not
hinder or prevent performance by the other.8 This is. not, however, extended to the point of obligating the one to facilitate or assist the other's
performance, except in circumstances from which it may be inferred that
the promisee is unqcr a duty to cooperate. In Whitt v. Godwin,fJ the
written promise to pay a sum of money to the promisee for a stated consideration was absolute in form, although there was evidence that the
promisee knew that the promisor hoped to obtain the money with which
to make payment from a third party who was demanding that both promisor and promisee join in a release discharging the third party from a
5. 205 Va.441, 138 S.E. 2d 55 (1964).
6. Although this contract had not been formally executed by the defendant, the
Court found assent from the acts and conduct of the parries.
7. However, what was the consideration for the indemnification promise, if not the
price to be paid for the equipment and technical advice? Or was it the assent to enter
into the equipment and technical service contracts? If the latter, is not the issue one of
proving fraud in the inducement rather than a collateral contract?
8. 5 WILUSToN, CoNTRACTS§ 677A (3d ed. 1961).
9. 205 Va. 797. 139 S.F. 2d 841 (1965).
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certain liability. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
holding that the refusal of the promisee to execute the release was no defense
to the promisee's action against the promisor. The result reached was
reinforced by the fact that the promisee had stated at the time of the
execution of the agreement with the promisor that he would not be willing
to sign the release, and the promisor nevertheless had made his promise
absolute and not expressly conditioned upon the promisee's joining in the
release.
Applicability of the parol evidence rule also entered into the issue
before the Supreme Court, which said that the rule is not one of evidence
but of substantive law, and that therefore although parol evidence may have
been admitted without objection, a court may disregard it upon a subsequent motion for summary judgment.10
D.mzages for Willful Defects Without Fraud
A contractor's suit to enforce a mechanic's lien in the amount of the
unpaid contract price was met by the owner's counterclaim for defective
work. 11 The owner prevailed on his counterclaim and was given judgment
for the full amount of the damages without offset of the unpaid contract
price. The Supreme Court of Appeals could find no justification for this
result on the grounds that the contractor's departures were made knowingly
and willfully, but without fraud. The Court distinguished the "no recovery for intentional departure" cases from those in which the contractor
and owner asserted offsetting cbims and from those where the departures
did not involve bad faith. The Court noted that disallowance of the offset
for the unpaid contract price would in this case place the owner in a
better position than if the contract had been wholly performed in accordance with its terms, and subject the contractor to punitive measures
despite the lack of any bad faith.
.
The major part of the Court's opinion in this case was concerned with
an interesting, but not novel, agency issue-whether an architect who is
to have general supervision of the work has authority to bind the owner
by approval of substantial changes in the specifications. It is generally held
that the architect's supervisory authority does not constitute him a general
agent of the owner for all purposes. 12 The Court's adherence to the general
rule was facilitated by specific terms of the contract between the owner .
and the contractor which expressly limited the architect's authority to
approve changes. in the work.
10. See Laughlin, Evidence, 1964-196) Anm1al Survey of Va. La·w, 51 VA. L. REv.
& n.i (1965).

II. Kirk Reid Co. v. Fine, 205 Va. 778, 139 S.E. 2d 829 (1965).
JuR. 2o Arcbitects § 6, at 668 (1962).

12. 5 AM.
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No Estoppel Against State Acting in Governmental Capacity
Another case in which reliance upon the authority of subordinate employees to approve substantial changes was found to be misplaced is Main v.
Department of High-u•aysP As in Kirk Reid Co. 7..'. Fine, 14 the contract expressly provided the method for authorizing substantial changes in the
highway construction specifications, and the contractor's failure to adhere
proved fatal to his right to recover for extra work. Resort to an estoppel
contention was met with the holding that the doctrine does not apply to
the rights of a state when acting in its sovereign or go\·emmental capacity.
The Court also passed upon the validity of an arbitration provision in the
contract, holding that it was enforceable as an implied condition precedent
to the right of action.

Tenninability of Exclusive Agency Agreement To Procure a Purchaser
Distinguishing clauses in exclusive listing agreements requiring "efforts
to find a purchaser" and "making r~asonable efforts to sell" from one
\l.:hich required "procuring a purchaser and advertising therefor," the
Supreme Court of Appeals held that in the latter instance there is only
an offer by the owner which is terminable in good faith at any time prior
to acceptance effected by the agent's producing someone ready, willing
and able to buy on the stated terms of sale. In Hummer v. Engeman,tr, the
agent's prospective purchaser was willing to meet the scheduled payments
upon commensurate piecemeal release of the land, which counteroffer was
not acceptable to the owner. Reversing the lower court judgment for the
agent, the Court held that the owner's termination of the agency and
subsequent sale to another within the thirty-day perio.d set forth in the
agreement for the duration of the exciusive agency did not subject the
mvner to liability for payment of a commission to the agent.
Where the consideration to be given by the agent is recited to be his
efforts, there, too, in the absence of an agency coupled with an interest,
the agreement is unilateral. Acceptance is effected by the agent's making
substantial efforts, whereupon the owner becomes bound for the duration
of the agency agreement. 16 The significance of the distinction lies not
in the unilateral or bilateral nature of the agreement, but in the performance
required to effectuate the agent's acceptance.
13. 206 Va. 143, 142 S.E. 2d 524 (1965).
14. 205 Va. 778, 139 S.E.2d 829 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 11 & 1:!

supra.
15. 206 Va. 102, 141 S.E.2d 716 (1965).
16. See 1\lorris v. Bragg, 155 Va. 912, 156 S.E. 381 (1931); Wilson v. Brown, 136 Va.
634, 118 S.E. 88 (1923). Both cases are mentioned by the Court in the principal case
as exemplifying the distinction in consequences depending upon the nature of the performance required of the agent.
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Anticipatory Breach Eliminates Tender Requirement
Optionee timely notified optionor that it elected to exercise its option
to purchase the subject property and proffered a contract to purchase
which it contended was wholly in conformance with the sale terms set
forth in the agreement. Optionor refused to execute the tendered contract, there being a difference of opinion as to whether a major provision
thereof was in accord with the option agreement. Optionee brought suit
for specific performance in advance of the date set forth for final performance and without tendering the purchase price or entering into further
negotiations to arrive at contract terms suitable to the optionor. The
factual question whether optionee's proposed contract embodied the option
terms was resolved in its favor and in Two-Way Tronics, Inc. v. Greater
lVashington Educational Television Ass'n11 the Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed the holding of the lower court that optionor's refusal to execute
the contract preferred by optionee constituted an anticipatory breach.
This, the Court held, permitted suit in advance of the performance date
and eliminated the requirement of tender of the purchase price by the
vendee as well as any alleged requirement that the vendee enter into
further negotiations to obtain the vendor's acceptance of terms. These
would seem to be the well-recognized consequences of an anticipatory
breach.

True Ow11er's Chain of Title St,·ouger Th.m Tbiefs
There are few exceptions to the general rule that a thief cannot convey
a title superior to that of the true owner, even to one who pays full value
and in good faith. One of the exceptions pertains to the negotiation of
stolen documents of title under some of the uniform acts;18 another is in the
transfer of a vehicle in strict certificate of title jurisdictions. 19 Virginia
has certificate of title laws,:w but does not align herself with those states
which treat the title certificate as conclusive of interest,21 and in Vicars v.
Atlamic Discount Co.22 the certificate of title holder, whose chain of title
went back to a thief, was compelled to surrender possession of a car to the
17. 206 Va. llO. 141 S.E.2d 742 (1965).
18. See, e.g., UNIFORM CoMMERCHL ConE § 7-502(2); VA. ConE ANN. § 8.7-502(2)
(1965).
19. See, e.g., Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); OHIO
REv. ConE ANN.§ 4505.04 (Page 1965).
20. VA. ConE ANN.§§ 46.1-41 to -98 (1958).
21. See l\kQuay v. Mount Vernon Bank & Trust Co., 200 Va. 776, 108 S.E.2d 251
(1959).
22. 205 Va. 934, 140 S.E.2d 667 (1965).
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holder of a conditional sale contract who succeeded to the rights of the
original buyer, a conditional vendee in default. Although the bill of sale
to the original buyer was unsigned and recited an incorrect serial number,
the Court held that under Georgia law, where the sale had been made, no
bill of sale was essential to pass title to personalty and that other irrefutable
evidence of identification was sufficient to overcome the incorrect serial
number designation.23

No Implied Warranty of Quality in Sale or Bailment of Used Car
A prospective used car buyer was invited by the dealer to take the car
out for a trial run with a view to inducing its sale. In the course of the
trial run, a tire blew out, causing the car to overturn and injure the
prospective buyer-bailee. His action to recover damages from the dealer
was grounded on negligence and breach of implied warmnty of safety
and suitability. The bailee failed to prove negligence to the satisfaction
of either the trial court of the Supreme Court of Appeals.24 On the breach
of 'varranty count, the Court noted the "almost unanimous" view that
no warranty of quality is implied in the sale of a used automobile,25 and
concluded that since no such warranty is implied in the case of a sale, a
fortiori it is not to be implied on a bailment to test with a view to purchase.
MISCELLANEOUS

Section 8-673 of the Virginia Code26 protects the title of a purchaser
at a judicial sale unless the sale is set aside within twelve months from its
confirmation. In Finkel Outdoor Products, Inc. v. Bei/,27 the Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the protection does not extend as against prior
judgment lien creditors who were not served with process and made parties
to the suit from which the decree of sale emanated. The Court also found
that the facts did not establish a defense of laches, and held that in any
event the creditors were not asserting an equitable right but a legal one
not subject to the doctrine.
23. See also In re Lowry, 40 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1930), to the effect that an incorrect
serial number designation is not decisive of nullity.
24. Smith v. Mooers, 206 Va. 307, 142 S.E.2d 473 (1965). See also Emroch, Torts,
1964-1965 Annual Survey of Va. Law, 51 VA. L. REv.-,- (1965), for discussion of the
negligence issue.
25. See 8 AM. ju&. 2o Automobiles § 655 (1963). \Vhile the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Virginia version thereof do not specifically exclude the implied warranties
<lf quality in the sale of used goods, they do provide that the warranties can be excluded
"by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade." UNIFORM CoMMERCI..,I. CoDE§ 2-316(3) (c); VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-316(3)(c) (1965).
26. VA. ConE ANN. S 8-673 (1957).
27. 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695 (1965).
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An agreement to subordinate one's claim to a mortgage may include
subordination to all debts secured by the mortgage and not just the face
amount of the mortgage recited in the agreement. In Globe Iron Construction Co. v. First National Bank of Bost01z2 B the Court found this to be
the clear import of the agreement terms; it could not be explained away
by a contrary understanding of only one of the parties.
The voiding of a lien where the subject property has been removed from
the county where recorded for more than one year is provided for by
section 55-98,29 which was applied in Richmond Auto Parts, Inc. v. Forbes/30
A running account generally constitutes but one cause of action and
cannot be divided into separate claims so as to provide a basis for several
actions.=n Accordingly, in Deal v. C. E. Nix & Son, bzc.32 the seller prevailed
only by proving that his delivery of fuel oil to six separate properties
of the buyer constituted six separate accounts.33 His default judgment for
the amount due for fuel oil delivered to one of the properties was therefore
held not to merge actions for the amounts due for fuel delivered to the
other properties.
In United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, lnc.,34 the United States
Supreme Court held that a Virginia landlord's lien, until actually enforced
by levy, was merely a caveat of a more perfect lien to come. And in United
States v. Lawler,ss the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia followed
Waddill in upholding the priority of a federal tax lien docketed prior to a
landlord's distress warrant, writ uf attachment and execution sale, although
the tenancy had commenced anJ the rent had become in arrears prior to
the federal assessment. In United States v. New Rose Development Corp.,36
the Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed its Lawler concepts.
28. 205 Va. 841, 140 S.E.Zd 629 (1965).
29. VA. Cone ANN. § 55-98 (1959), repealed effecth·e Jan. 1. 1966. Ya. Acts of Assembly 1964, c. 219.
30. 205 Va. 856, 140 S.E.2d 825 (1965).
31. 1 AM.}UR. 2o Actions§ 142 (1962).
32. 206 Va. 57, 141 S.E.2d 683 (1965).
33. \Vhere the running of the statute of limitations is involved, and nor the splitting
of causes of action, a seller may be urging a single account rather than separate ones in
order to establish commencement of the statutory period at the time of last delivery.
This was the case in Columbia Heights Section 3. Inc. v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 205 Va.
43, 135 S.E.2d 116 (1964), discussed in Cunis, Comr.rcts & Sales, 1963-1964 Annual Sur'i:ey of Va. La·w, 50 VA. L. Rev. 1280, 1282 0964).
34. 323 u.s. 353 (1945).
35. 201 Va. 686, 112 S.£.2d 921 (1960), discussed in Curtis, Taxation, 1959-1960 Anmtal Sur'i.•ey of Va. Law, 46 VA. L. Rt.v. 1523, 1524 0960).
36. ~05 \·a. 697, 139 S.F..2d 64 0964).

